Existing evidence suggests that returns to entrepreneurship are low. In particular, Hamilton (2000) claims that entrepreneurs face a stream of future median earnings far below what they could earn as employees. These findings have been associated with non-pecuniary benefits, and more generally with heterogeneity in preferences, rationality or beliefs. In this paper I challenge this view. I extend the data to include younger and older workers and entrepreneurs. I show that the differential in earnings is in fact U-shaped, with entrepreneurs earning more than wage workers both early and late in their lives. I argue that the difference in the earnings profile can be rationalized in the context of a life-cycle model of occupational choice where agents are fully informed, face no uncertainty, are fully rational, and ex-ante identical. I estimate this model and show that the lifetime returns to entrepreneurship can in fact be identical to those of being a wage worker.
Introduction
One surprising result in the literature on entrepreneurship is that median entrepreneurs fare less well than their wage-worker counterparts. In fact, the median entrepreneur is "poor" relative to his counterparts in the more traditional labor force. Hamilton (2000) , for example, focuses on how well median entrepreneurs do when they've been in their businesses for between 10 and 35 years. Using the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation he shows that for all those levels of tenure, the median wage worker's hourly wage is higher than the that of the median entrepreneur.
1 Thus, the conventional view of a high-tech entrepreneur who may struggle early on to make it big after a few years is not representative. * I wish to offer my warmest thanks to Boyan Jovanovic and Virgiliu Midrigan who supported and encouraged me every step of the way. I would also like to thank the participants of the Stern Macro Lunch Series, the Stern Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies Workshop and the Annual Roundtable for Engineering Entrepreneurship Research (REER) for useful comments and suggestions. Finally, I am indebted to Marina Agranov, Guillaume Frechette, Andrew Schotter and Ofer Setty for their support during my tenure at NYU. 1 In 1989, entrepreneurs made up 9% of the labor force and although they held 39% of its wealth, the distribution of wealth among entrepreneurs was heavily skewed. See Gentry and Hubbard, 2004 The disparity in earnings is such a puzzle that so far models trying to explain it have relied mainly on heterogeneity between entrepreneurs and workers, for example in their preferences, rationality or beliefs. While either of these explanations may be sensible, they are sensible only for the "truncated" data that were available until now.
In this paper, I start by re-visiting the empirical evidence. I show that the earnings differential between entrepreneurs and wage workers is in fact U-shaped. Entrepreneurs earn more than workers both early and late in their lives. Previous empirical evidence only focused on the middle period of individuals' lives, leading to the finding that entrepreneurs earn less than workers. Based on the extended data, I conclude that the empirical evidence is not necessarily in favor of workers.
I then formulate a theory to account for these facts. Contrary to previous work, I do not rely on ex-ante heterogeneity between workers and entrepreneurs, irrationality or uncertainty of any kind. In my model, all agents are identical at the start of their lives and choose to either become an entrepreneur or to become a worker that will work for an entrepreneur.
2 What happens to agents after their choice depends, however, on which occupation they selected. Ex-post, agents face different opportunities. For workers, consumption decisions do not affect their labor income: whether they choose to consume their entire wage or save, they will, in each period, earn the same wage. This is not true of entrepreneurs. Indeed, an entrepreneur faces a tradeoff between consuming and re-investing the firm's output. Thus, an entrepreneur's consumption decision affects the firm's future output, and therefore his future labor income. In other words, entrepreneurs have control over the production process and can therefore affect their stream of labor income while workers cannot. So, in this model, workers and entrepreneurs are fundamentally different in a single dimension: the former group is committed to a wage while the second has the ability to determine it. This does not result from any ex-ante difference. It results from the essence of what it means to be an entrepreneur versus a worker.
In the baseline model, in each period, entrepreneurs produce, decide how much to consume and how much to invest for next period's production. 3 Labor is the only factor of production, so that investment is in fact the following period's wage bill. 4 Workers on the other hand simply consume their wage.
5
Whether the difference in labor income between entrepreneurs and workers is U-shaped is driven by their rate of time preferences. For the difference to be U-shaped, if I assume exponential discounting, the yearly discount rate δ would have to be lower than .65. Indeed, for agents to be indifferent between a path of labor income that is constant (equal to the equilibrium wage) or relatively high early on and then very low for many periods, At this time, agents compare their utility from being wage workers with their utility from becoming an entrepreneur. Because agents are identical, this implies that the values of becoming an entrepreneur or a worker are the same, so they are indifferent between occupations. Selection into either occupation is only pinned down by a labor market equilibrium condition.
3
In the baseline model there are no longer-term investments though I do study a model where investment is for more than one period.
4
This is similar to a cash-in-advance assumption.
5
I also study a setting in which all agents have access to one-period bonds in zero net supply, the important features of the results are largely unchanged.
agents would have to be very impatient. While a yearly discount rate δ of .65 seems implausible if agents discount periods in an exponential way, it is much more reasonable if we allow agents to have quasi-geometric discounting. In this setting, the "traditional" yearly discount rate δ climbs up to .85, and the quasi-geometric term β is .75.
With quasi-geometric preferences, agents discount more between the present and the next period, compared with how much agents discount between any two other consecutive dates. Essentially, if an exponential discounter discounts periods 1, δ, δ 2 , δ 3 ..., the quasi-geometric discounter will weight future periods using the discount rates 1, βδ, βδ 2 , βδ 3 ... So, a quasi-geometric discounter will discount tomorrow with a weight βδ relative to today. However, the way he discounts periods 2 and 3 relative to period 1 is simply δ. One way to view this is to think of agents having different "selves," and in each period, the decision an agent makes is one that solves the subgame perfect equilibrium. Agents know themselves and so realize that they will not be able to commit and take that into account when making their occupational choice decision. 6 Because of these preferences and lack of commitment, they know that their future self will want to shift consumption towards the present. Quantitatively, with quasi-geometric discounting the model's predictions are closer to the empirical data.
7
The intuition behind the U-shape pattern is the following. The inability to commit to actions affects entrepreneurs and workers asymmetrically. A paid employee in way commits to a wage. So while his preferences would affect other investment decisions, they do not affect his labor income. This is not the situation of an entrepreneur since he controls his means of production and therefore his labor income. A relatively high discount rate pushes the entrepreneur to shift production towards the present and consume early. This drives why entrepreneurs' labor income is higher than that of workers in the early periods. But by doing this, entrepreneurs cannibalize their means of production and impoverish their future selves. So, while an entrepreneur enjoys higher income early in his life, in the middle run, his situation will deteriorate relative to workers. Towards the end of his life, the entrepreneur will see his relative situation improve. Indeed, in the last period of his life, the entrepreneur will liquidate his firm. The agents' preference for consumption smoothing will make him spread this higher consumption over a few periods preceding the late one. This together with the fact that the entrepreneur was sophisticated, and so saved more than if he was unaware of his inability to commit, will let the entrepreneurs' income be higher than that of the workers towards the end of the life-cycle.
Finally, in this paper I address an additional question regarding measurement. The existing data relates to labor income and not consumption. 8 Clearly, looking at labor income does not necessarily reflect consumption levels and therefore utility levels. I show that introducing a one-period bond in the economy will make agents' consumption equal, but the differences between the labor incomes of workers and entrepreneurs will still follow the U-shape pattern. 9 So, it is possible to have entirely different labor income streams This is typically referred to as "sophistication" as opposed to "naivete", where agents are unaware of their inability to commit.
See the Additional Literature part in this section for more on quasi-geometric preferences. See the data section for a discussion on the different sources of data and the limitations concerning consumption data.
and both have the same present discounted value of utility at the time of the occupational choice, and have agents of a particular tenure consume at the same levels regardless of occupation. This paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first one to empirically analyze the entire life-cycle of workers and entrepreneurs, and to provide a parsimonious model that is also consistent with the empirical data. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the data using the 
Related Litterature
A related puzzle in the entrepreneurship literature is the "private equity premium puzzle:" Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen use the Survey of Consumer Finances from 1989 to 1998 and show that entrepreneurs' returns in their private business are similar to returns of public businesses. Given Hamilton's findings and the fact that entrepreneurs concentrate more than 70% of their wealth in their business, the decision to become an entrepreneur is even more puzzling. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen suggest that non-pecuniary benefits and heterogeneity between entrepreneurs and workers, for example in their rationality, preferences or beliefs account for this. 10 In this paper, I focus solely on median earnings. In the conclusion section, however, I return to the puzzle regarding second moments and discuss it in light of my findings.
Regarding quasi-geometric preferences, there is vast experimental evidence that people exhibit discounting that is not exponential. Indeed, in laboratory and field experiments, agents tend to discount the current and next period differently than any two other consecutive future periods. This matches many field and lab experiments that find that discount rates are larger in the short run than in the long run. 11 There has also been non-experimental evidence that supports quasi-geometric discounting, for example in savings/borrowing decisions.
12 Nonetheless, the assumption of quasi-geometric discounting is far from being uncontroversial. 13 sumption stream. 10 Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina develop a partial equilibrium model of "endogenous risk taking that explains why self-financed entrepreneurs may want to invest in risky projects offering no risk premium," in their 2006 working paper "Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs". Their finding is explained by the fact that entrepreneurs have an "outside" option (wage work) and so can take on riskier projects. Kilhstrom and Laffont (1978) say that entrepreneurs have a lower degree of risk aversion and so don't require a risk-premium. 
Data
The data presented here is from the first wave of the 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation 14 . Women were dropped from the analysis to avoid labor force participation issues. An individual is called an "entrepreneur" if he is self-employed, has had to invest in his business, and if their business is non-casual.
15 Both incorporated and non-incorporated businesses are in the sample. People who are both entrepreneurs and work for a wage at another job are dropped from the sample.
16 Finally, anyone in the farming sector was dropped from the analysis since much of their earnings may come from subsidies.
17
The final sample consists of 21,733 individuals among which 2,261, or roughly 10.4%, qualify as entrepreneurs.
18 Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of firm age (for the entrepreneurs) and tenure in a firm (for the workers). They are, as expected, heavily skewed to the right, as people may switch jobs, or entrepreneurs abandon their business.
19
Raw Data Figure 1 shows the median hourly wages by tenure. 20 In the SIPP, individuals who held a job were asked for how long they had that job were asked how long they had been in
14
The same analysis was conducted using the 1996 and 2005 data sets: all the qualitative features of the data are the same. I have requested the 1984 dataset that Hamilton used in his analysis from the Census Bureau but it has been temporarily "misplaced."
15
That is, if the business generates at least $2,500 a year.
16
This has very little bearing on the results: similar results were found by assigning people to the occupation that generated the higher earnings or to the occupation in which they worked the most hours.
17
In this we follow Hamilton (2000) .
18
This proportion is inline with previous research.
19
While in the data there is information on occupational tenure for workers, there is no equivalent to occupational tenure for an entrepreneur. Running the analysis using occupational or job tenure for workers yields the same qualitative results.
20
All regressions and statistical test were performed on the data using the weights provided by the SIPP data set. the same job, and individuals who owned a business were asked when the business was created. Those are the values that correspond to tenure in these graphs. People who were workers were asked if they had an hourly wage. If so, this number was used. For those not paid by the hour and for entrepreneurs, monthly income received from the business or employer was divided by the number of hours worked. The model is silent on whether the variable to compare should be hourly earnings or total working income. The data work was done on both measures 21 with similar results. 22 Figure 2 shows the difference in wages between workers and entrepreneurs as a function of tenure, and Figure 3 shows the percentage difference in hourly wages between entrepreneurs and workers as a function of tenure. As is clear from all those graphs, entrepreneurs' hourly wages are higher for entrepreneurs relative to workers both early and late in their lives. The opposite is true for levels of tenure between 9 and 39 years.
Workers
The results of a weighted median test at each level of tenure are represented in Figure  4 . A point at +1 (-1) means that for that level of tenure the median hourly wage of entrepreneurs is significantly higher (lower) than that of a worker.
23 This shows that despite the relatively low number of observations for tenure levels beyond 30, the interpretation of the previous graphs rest on statistically solid ground. So, the impression left by the fitted lines reflects statistically significant differences between entrepreneur and workers even when looking at the data for each level of tenure independently.
21
On average entrepreneurs work more hours per week than workers so the results could have been different if the plot were of income against tenure.
22
See appendix B for the "income" graphs.
23
All points at +1 or -1 are significant at the 2% level except for year 45 that is significant at the 8% level. Table 3 and Figure 5 describe the predicted hourly wages for entrepreneurs and workers using a quantile regression at the median of the following equation:
Quantile Regression
where H it is a vector of observed individual characteristics, f (x) = x + x 2 + x 3 , Tenure is the number of years in a specific job or business, Experience is potential labor market experience (equal to age-education-6), Entrepreneur is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is an entrepreneur, and it is a random error term. The individual characteristics used are education levels, 24 and age, as well as dummies on race, marital status, presence of children, whether the individual has a health issue that impedes his work.
25
These results confirm my finding that if we take into account the early and late periods of individuals' lives, the differential in earnings is U-shapped, even controlling for observables such as the ones in the regression described above. 26 The positive coefficients for
24
Highschool or GED, college with degree, some college no degree, more than a college degree.
25
These terms were also interacted with an Entrepreneur dummy with no significant differences.
26
A weighted test of medians show that the predicted earnings for entrepreneurs are higher than those of workers anywhere between 6 and 7 out of the first eight years of tenure (depending on which dummies I included in the regression). tenure and potential labor market experience for entrepreneurs show that early on, wages respond more fore entrepreneurs to years of tenure and experience matter entrepreneurs. The negative sign in front of the quadratic terms (interacted with Entrepreneur) show that in the middle part of their lives, entrepreneurs' wages will grow less than those of wage workers, with the wage of wage workers becoming higher than those of workers. Finally, the positive coefficients in front of the cubic terms indicate that again at the end of their lives, entrepreneurs' wages will increase faster than those of wage workers, eventually becoming higher.
Parameter Estimates from Hourly Earnings Quantile Regression

27
Evidence on starting wages The 1984 panel asks an additional question relative to more recent panels. They asks all responders their wage when they first started their current job/business. I use these responses to construct the following variable. For each level of tenure, I take the median response for workers and for entrepreneurs. I show the result of this exercise in the Figure  6 . For example, one can see that entrepreneurs who had 30 years of tenure in 1984 had a median starting wage of about $3, while the median starting wage for workers who had 30 years of tenure in 1984 was a little less than $2. Figure 6 corroborates the raw data as well as evidence from the regression above.
Finally, I conduct a weighted test of medians. For each level of tenure, I test whether the distribution of hourly wages for entrepreneurs and workers come from distributions with the same median. I conclude from this test that in about %80 of the tenure levels,
I conducted robustness checks by running regressions using different combinations of the dummies with no notable changes in the results.
when the median entrepreneur started his business, he earned more than the starting median wage worker. This is evidence that the finding that entrepreneurs earn more than wage workers early in their tenure is robust across years.
SIPP Verus Other Data Sets
[Discussion on CPS, CEX, PSID, SCF] I attempted to corroborate these findings using other data sets. PSID and SCF: ask the right questions but are too small (few thousand interviewees with fewer than 300 entrepreneurs in the final sample -5 of first 8 years entrep earn more). CEX, CPS lack "how long have you had this particular job/business".
Model Environment
The environment is a dynamic model of overlapping generations with no population growth. Agents are identical and live for (T+1) periods and have commitment problems in the absence of a commitment technology. At the start of their lives, agents must choose between becoming entrepreneurs (or managers) who hire workers, or becoming workers who work for the entrepreneurs. At the beginning of each period, workers receive a wage w (per efficiency unit of skill) and managers receive the production of each worker and choose how much to consume and how much to invest in next period's production.
Preferences
Using the idea introduced by Strotz (1958) , Phelps and Pollack (1968) , and Laibson (1997), agents' rank streams of consumption according to the following quasi-geometric preferences:
The parameter β represents the commitment level of an agent. If β=1 we are in the case of standard exponential preferences and there are no commitment issues: agents do not deviate from their time-zero decisions. As β decreases, agents face commitment problems and deviate from time-zero decisions. In other words, the agents are timeinconsistent. Agents are sophisticated and realize that they will have this commitment issue and make their decisions based on that knowledge.
The utility function u[c] is continuously differentiable, increasing and concave.
The Agents They are identical. Each agent is described by two parameters: labor productivity A w , and an entrepreneurial productivity A(t). Following Lucas 78', we take λ = 1.
The Production Process
Output is increasing and proportional to entrepreneurial ability for any level of labor hired by the firm. An entrepreneur who spends an amount k on labor can hire l = k/(λw) = k/w efficiency units of labor. Labor is the only factor of production. More precisely:
where f (l) is increasing in l and f (l) < 0. Since we have that l = k/w, it is the case that output equals Af k w .
Saving, Borrowing and Storage Technologies
Agents have no initial capital. I do not allow for defaulting.
28 Agents can lend and borrow risk-free 1-period bonds with interest rate 1 + r determined endogenously. Entrepreneurs transfer funds from one period to the next to hire workers in the next period.
Decision Variables
After the time-zero occupational decision, agents make sequential decisions. Agents solve the subgame perfect equilibrium being aware that they are quasi-geometric discounters.
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs take w and r as given and at each date decide how much to consume, how much labor to hire in the next period and how much to borrow. An important feature is that entrepreneurs have to decide how much to spend on labor one period in advance. If l t+1 is the amount of labor in the firm at date t + 1, the entrepreneur has to keep wl t+1 aside at date t. Let b t+1 be the amount an entrepreneur borrows at date t.
At time t, entrepreneurs solve the following maximization problem:
subject to:
An exception is period 0, where I assume that workers are paid contemporaneously and that initial debt is b 0 = 0. So, the budget constraint at date 0 is:
So, consumption, plus spending on next period's wage bill, plus what the entrepreneur must repay, is financed with output and debt. The first order conditions at date t > 0 are:
Given their choice of l t+1 and b t+1 , their consumption is:
Alternatively, we can assume that the penalty for defaulting is very high.
Workers
Workers supply labor inelastically and trade a risk-free bond with interest 1 + r. At every period, workers decide on how much to consume and how much to borrow. I use a superscript w to index the choice made by these agents.
At date t, workers solve the following maximization problem:
An exception is period 0, where I assume that initial debt b w 0 = 0 so that the budget constraint at date 0 is:
So, consumption plus what the worker must repay is financed with the worker's wage and debt. The first order condition at date t > 0 is:
Given their choice of b t+1 , the consumption of workers is: Figure 7 shows the interaction between different generations of individuals for the first 3 and last period of their lives. All "middle" periods resemble the third. In the last period entrepreneurs don't have a wage bill for the "next period", and neither entrepreneurs nor workers can borrow positive amounts. So, after reimbursing any debts, entrepreneurs consume their firm's production entirely. 1 that an entrepreneur cares only about the total efficiency units of labor that he hires. Indeed, for him, workers are substitutable. Further, Equations 2 and 3 lead to:
Results
It is clear from Equation
which means that all agents' consumption grows at the same rate. This implies that for a given tenure, both workers and entrepreneurs will have the same consumption. However, while their consumption is equal, their labor incomes are not (the bonds making up the difference). In other words, we can see labor income can vary wildly and yet have identical consumption paths.
[Proof of why consumption cannot be constant here]. 
Path of Labor Income
For a worker, labor income is simply A w t w, it obviously follows that labor income will increase or decrease with A t . For an entrepreneur, labor income is A t f (l t ) − wl t+1 .
So, labor income increases iff A is increasing.
Market Clearing Conditions and Selection into Occupations
Equilibrium in the labor market: The total demand for workers in a given period is the sum of the demands from all the entrepreneurs. I call e be the proportion of agents of a particular generation who choose to become entrepreneurs. Since all agents of a given tenure consume the same amounts, no entrepreneurs or workers have any incentive to switch occupation. Therefore, e is independent of age. As is clear from Equation 1, an entrepreneur only cares about the total efficiency units of labor that he hires. As all agents are identical ex-ante, they are indifferent between which occupation to select into. The proportion e of agents becoming entrepreneurs is pinned down by imposing that the labor market clears: The Equilibrium Definition The equilibrium is characterized by a pair (w, r) such that:
1. Agents' consumptions streams {c t } 
29
More generally, if there is a distribution Φ of ability in the population, and z is ability of the marginal manager (the one who is indifferent between becoming a manager or remaining a worker), we instead have: Total Demand of workers=
2. All first order conditions are met.
3. The labor and bond markets clear.
Numerical Solutions Calibration
All simulations were done with α = .8, and σ = 0.1 30 so that the production function becomes l 0.8 and the utility function u(c) = c 0.9 .9
. For the productivity function, I use the following parameterization:
For > 0, w > 0, γ > 0 and γ w > 0 this parameterization reflects the findings that productivity first increases, reaches a peak and then decreases over an individual's experience.
31 . If we want productivity peak to happen at t * , then the following relationship has to hold true: γ = t * −1+e t * . Below I will assume that A t = A w t and show results for both the case where = ∞, γ = 0, and A = 1, corresponding to the case where productivity is constant across time and equal to 1, as well as for the case where we have a productivity peak at 10 years of tenure.
32
Estimation
The metric use to rank estimates is how well the relative hourly wage patterns of entrepreneurs and workers fit. I use a quadratic loss rule, penalizing deviations from the percentage difference in wage between median entrepreneurs and workers. 
31
See Bakh and Gort (1993) and Jovanovic and Mincer (?).
32
When this peak happens and whether it is the same for entrepreneurs and workers is unclear. The results of the estimation depend of course on the value of t * as well as the value of .
33
In the model with bonds I can only identify the product βδ. 
Environment with constant productivity
Environment with no financial markets Without financial markets, workers simply consume their wage. The entrepreneur's first order condition is now:
The estimation produces best results at βδ = .641. Figure 8 shows how the model's prediction fits relative to the data. We can see that the presence of bonds does not drive the result that entrepreneurs shift their labor income to early periods. If we constrain β to equal 1, or in other words if we want to fit this model to an exponential discounting rule, we would need δ = .641 to match the results.
In a practical sense, a quasi-geometric discounting rule with βδ = .641 would mean that an individual would prefer any amount greater than 64 dollars today rather than 100 dollars in a year from now, while if that same individual were given the choice between waiting one year to get 63 dollars or 2 to receive 100 would prefer the latter. Figure 9 shows the equilibrium prediction of the model if we constrain agents to be exponential discounters with more "typical" discount rates.
34 With exponential discounting, the predicted earnings differential cannot account for any of the data (aside from the 34 These qualitative features hold for ranges of δ above .7 if we constrain β = 1. end tail). To understand the fundamental difference between an exponential discounter and a quasi-geometric one, it is useful to look at Figure 10 . Figure 10 shows the investment path that an exponential discounter and a quasi-geometric one will follow. An exponential discounter will not need to borrow higher amounts early on because he can commit to saving. A quasi-geometric discounter on the other hand will borrow more in order to "start of with more" and therefore make sure that he will have enough later in his life. Because an exponential discounter can commit, he will save early, and reap the benefits afterwards. It is not that a quasi-geometric agent won't save. Indeed he will, but because the borrowing decision is different, while he saves, he also gets to consume more. For a quasi-geometric discounter there are two forces going in opposite directions: he wants to consume early, but at the same time, he knows he needs to take his future selves into account and save for them. One way of achieving both is to borrow more at the beginning.
[MORE HERE]
Environment with one-period risk-free bonds In this setting, I cannot identify β and δ separately. The reason is that the bonds allow all agents of the same tenure to consume the same amounts, regardless of occupation. So, not only are present discounted values of utility identical (as required by the equilibrium definition), but for agents of equal tenure, the per-period consumptions and therefore utilities are identical. This makes identifying the discount rates separately impossible.
The estimation produces best results at βδ = .645. If we want to fit this model to an exponential discounting rule, we obtain a yearly δ of .645. The loss function if we look at exponential discount rates within the range .85-.99 (constraining β to equal 1) which are typically used in calibrations is about 5000% worse than at the optimal. These results are made clear if we look at Figure 11 . Figure 11 constrains β to equal 1 and shows how the predicted mean percentage difference between entrepreneurs and workers depends on the value of delta. In the data I use this value is about 8.5% per year. Higher values of δ do not only give worse fits, but they would predict that entrepreneurs earn more than workers over their lifetime. In fact, high values of δ predict reverse relative earnings: entrepreneurs earn less early, and more afterwards. Figure 12 shows how the value of δ affects the prediction of the model for the first period. We see that aside from "low" values of δ, the prediction of the model is opposite of that of the data. Finally, in Figure  13 I show the prediction of the model if we constrain β to equal 1, and assume that δ is closer to the more standard values.
35 As is easy to see, the predictions are very much opposite of the data in all levels of tenure aside from the end. Figure 13 shows the percentage difference in labor income from the data and predicted by the model for βδ = .645. Comparing to Figure 14 we see how crucial quasi-geometric discounting is. Figure 14 , which assumes that βδ = .85 shows that qualitatively the predictions are opposite of the data.
35
In this case I use δ = .85, though the qualitative predictions are similar for any δ >.7, with higher values of δ leading to worse and worse fits. As the theory suggests, for each level of tenure, entrepreneurs and workers will consume the same amounts. Figure However , even though their consumptions are equal, the difference in their labor income will be U-shapped. We know that:
So while c t and c w are equal, their labor income can be different. The difference between their labor income is compensated with their bond holdings, as shown in Figure  15 .
The model's predictions without financial markets are qualitatively the same. Below I present it in detail and use this framework to discuss why quasi-geometric preferences are a better fit.
Environment with changing productivity
Environment with one-period risk-free bonds I use [ Note: It is unclear what t "should" represent. Labor market experience? Tenure in a firm? Entrepreneurs and workers with zero years of tenure in fact have labor market experience of 16 and 14 years respectively. In Figure 16 , I assumed that t starts at 16 years for entrepreneurs and workers so that A t = A 1−e − (t+16) (t+16) γ . Further, if experience/tenure affects workers and entrepreneurs differently -ie they "peak" at different times, this will affect the results. A few simulations show me that if entrepreneurs peak earlier I'll get closer-to-data predictions. ]
Introducing a Commitment Device
In a partial equilibrium setting where wages were taken as given by entrepreneurs, it is clear that introducing a commitment device that would force entrepreneurs to adhere to their time-zero decisions would increase the present discounted value of their utility. In a general equilibrium setting such as in this model, this is not necessarily the case
Discussion
Until this paper, the empirical evidence only included the years 10 through 35, that is the period when the median entrepreneurs face lower wages than the median workers. The explanations that were available until now cannot account for the new evidence, ie the non-linearity of the earnings differential. Here I will discuss the main ones in turn.
Precautionary Saving and Bequest Motives
This could address the issue that entrepreneurs can "hide" their wages by keeping them in the firm. On reason for doing this is that entrepreneurs may want to save in their firm in order to have a healthier retirement or in order to pass the firm down to potential heirs. However, if an entrepreneur has a precautionary savings motive or a bequest motive, then he would be better off retrieving a higher amount from his firm and investing it in equity that is less risky. Indeed, the returns to entrepreneurship do not compensate for the high amount of risk.
36
Non-pecuniary benefits There is evidence that entrepreneurs enjoy the privileges of not having a boss and thus enjoy non-pecuniary benefits. Some have use these benefits to explain the 10-35 year lull in entrepreneurial wages relative to the wages of workers. This is hard to reconcile with the U-shape pattern. To fit the evidence in years 10-35, this would mean that on average they give up 15% of hourly wages each year relative to wage workers. The difference in earnings is actually likely to be understated given that paid employees benefit from non-wage compensation such as paid vacation or health insurance.
37
Preference for Skewness The data show that the distribution of earnings for self-employed people is heavily skewed to the left. If entrepreneurs have a preference for skewness, they don't necessarily demand higher earnings to compensate for the volatility of their earnings. While this could account for the years 10-35, it is difficult to see this driving the result that both early and late in their lives entrepreneurs earn more relative to workers. Further, as Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen point out, skewness can be obtained more easily through options markets and other strategies. Thus, this may not be the main explanation behind even the 10-35 year lull.
Optimism
There is an existing body of work that shows that entrepreneurs are highly optimistic when asked about the survival of their firm. This implies that entrepreneurs maintaining a high level of optimism through 25 years of drought.
While the above explanations can together contribute to the extended evidence that I present in this paper U-shape pattern, alone none can.
Conclusion
In this paper I have:
1. Extended the existing empirical evidence on the median wage differential between entrepreneurs and workers to include data from the first ten years of tenure as well as years 35-46. I show that the differential is in fact U-shapped. With this new evidence, it is unclear that the returns to entrepreneurship would be lower than the returns to paid employment.
36
See Moskowitz and Vissing-Joergensen. 2. Presented a life-cycle model to show that while labor income may be different, the presence of a single one-period risk-free bond allows consumption between the two occupations to be equal at any given point in time.
3. Shown that even without the presence of financial markets, the present discounted value of utility can be equalized between the two occupations.
In the data section, I use the 2001 panel year of the SIPP data set. I control for observables via a quantile regression at the median and show that the differential in wages is U-shapped. With a test of medians, I further check that taking each year independently, the first ten years and the last 6 show the median entrepreneur earning more than the median worker, while the reverse is true for the years in between. Given the very different patterns in earnings early and late in agents' lives, it is crucial that work that compares wage workers and entrepreneurs include pay particular attention to tenure.
In this model, agents are fully rational, face no uncertainty, are fully informed and are identical before making an occupational decision. There is, however, a non-standard component in the way agents discount. I allow for an extra degree of freedom by allowing for agents to be quasi-geometric discounters. That is, they discount more between the present period and the next than between any two other consecutive dates. This feature drives the result that early on entrepreneurs have higher wages. The intuition is the following. An agent who has quasi-geometric preferences will want to consume more than an agent who is an exponential discounter. However, if he consumes more, all else being equal, he know that he will impoverish his future selves. To avoid that, he will borrow a larger amount that an exponential discounter would to start his firm. This will allow him to both consume more earlier and make sure that he has enough to invest in his firm for future periods.
